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Abstract. Jacob Lorhard published his ontology in 1606. In this work the term 
ontologia ‘ontology’ was used for the first time ever. In this paper, it is argued 
that Lorhard’s ontology provides a useful key to the understanding of the early 
17th-century world view in Protestant Europe. Among other things, Lorhard’s 
ontology reflects how the relations between scientific investigation and 
religious belief were seen. It is also argued that several of the conceptual 
choices which Lorhard made in order to establish his ontology may still be 
relevant for modern makers of ontological systems. In particular, Lorhard’s 
considerations on the notions of reality and time deserve modern reflections. 
Also his assumption of the educational value of diagrammatical ontology 
deserves a modern discussion. Along with this paper an online hypertext 
version of Lorhard’s ontology has been presented in order to create a useful tool 
for historical research in early 17th-century thought and in order to illustrate the 
problems, which characterized the early attempt at establishing a 
diagrammatical approach to ontology. 
Note: References with just a page number (e.g. [p.17]) refer to the English 
translation of Lorhard’s Ontology [7] 
1. Introduction 
The term ontologia (‘ontology’) was coined by Jacob Lorhard (1561--1609), who 
used this new term for the first time in his volume of eight books Ogdoas Scholastica 
(1606), in which he demonstrated how ontology could be presented in a 
diagrammatical manner (see [8] and [7, 9]). Lorhard’s way of presenting his ontology 
makes it natural, from a modern perspective, to read it as a hypertext. This makes it 
straightforward to implement Lorhard’s ontology as a modern hypertext (see [7]). 
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Lorhard’s ontology is relevant for contemporary historians as a semi-formal key to 
a 17th-century world-view.  The creation of such world-views was typical within 
academic circles of early 17th century Protestantism, so Lorhard's work provides us 
with a snapshot of the framework within which scientifc study was carried out in the 
17th century. Moreover, we argue that several of Lorhard’s considerations regarding 
the organization of his ontological system also warrant consideration by modern 
makers of ontological systems. The two considerations that we focus on in most detail 
are the concepts of reality and time.  The first concept, in particular, is of central 
importance, both in Lorhard's ontology and in modern ontologies. 
We begin in section 2 with some historical and conceptual background to Lorhard's 
ontology, providing a cultural and philosophical setting against which his views on 
time and reality should be evaluated. In section 3 we discuss Lorhard’s concept of 
reality as it is manifested both in beings and attributes, using the reality of moral 
qualities and of structures or orders in the world as specific examples. In section 4 we 
consider Lorhard’s treatment of the temporal aspects of beings. In section 5 we 
comment on Lorhard’s presentation of his ontology. We show that an implementation 
of the system provides a useful tool for research in the history of science and 
philosophy. It turns out that Lorhard’s ontology can be represented as a hypertext 
dealing with aspects of reality and time which are essential for the understanding of 
the world.  We make some concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
 
2. Some Comments on the Historical Setting 
 
In order to understand Lorhard's approach to ontology, and the effect that this had on 
his approach to doing science, we must understand the philosophical and social milieu 
within which he worked.  Lorhard's Ogdoas Scholastica was designed as a grammar 
school text-book.  As such, it was meant to introduce essential parts of the scientific 
and religious aspects of the world to the students. Lorhard was influenced by the 
tradition from Peter Ramus (1515--72), who wanted to transform dialectical reasoning 
into a single method of pedagogical logic partly by using diagrammatical tools (see 
[9]). Lorhard sees diagrammatical ontology in this context, believing that the students 
will benefit from a deeper understanding of the ontological truths. This view on 
education became very influential in Europe. This is evident, for instance, in the 
writings of the Danish professor Jens Kraft (1720--1756) who, in organizing a school 
for young people expected to become national leaders, insisted on making ontology 
an essential part of the curriculum. Kraft clearly believed that a deeper understanding 
of the ontological truths would help the students not only in obtaining a better 
understanding of the world but also in becoming better people ethically speaking (see 
[8]). 
Book 8 of Lorhard's Ogdoas is devoted to metaphysics or, in the new word that he 
introduces, ontology. At the end of the 16th century, the predominant view of 
metaphysics was that found in Suárez's Disputationes metaphysicae (which was 
published in Mainz in 1605 [4]).  On Suárez's view, the primary subject matter of 
metaphysics is being: "the concept of the real being which is the subject of 
metaphysics..." [p.614]. Suárez's text "fixed the method of instruction in metaphysics 
for centuries, not only in Catholic schools, but also in Protestant academies and 
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universities" [p.615] and "by the end of the [16th] century, Fonseca, Pereira, and 
Suárez were standard references in the newly founded Protestant universities'' [p.621]. 
His view was, however, rejected by Clemens Timpler of Heidelberg, whose 
Metaphysicae systema methodium was published in Steinfurt in 1604 and in Hanau in 
1606 [6]. (That Timpler knew of Suárez's views is clear from the fact that he 
references him in bk. 1, cap. 1, q. 7.) Timpler "proposed that the subject-matter of 
metaphysics is not being, but rather the intelligible, παν νοητον" [p.635]. He says that 
metaphysica est ars contemplatiua, quae tractact de omni intelligibili, quatenus ab 
homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile 
(metaphysics is a contemplative art which treats of every intelligible, to the extent that 
it is intelligible by men through the natural light of reason without any concept of 
matter) [bk. 1, cap. 1]. 
Timpler's work was enormously influential on Lorhard's ontology. Timpler's 
Metaphysicae is written in a more traditional style than Lorhard's textbook: it is 
divided in to five books, of which each chapter presents an aspect or a part of his 
metaphysical views, followed by a number of questions and answers dealing with the 
philosophical issues arising from the distinctions offered at the beginning of each 
chapter.  (For example, q. 5 of bk. 1, cap. 1 is 'what is the proper and adequate subject 
matter of Metaphysics?' to which the answer, naturally, is omne intelligibile 'every 
intelligible thing'.) The divisions and distinctions in Timpler's work can be found 
almost universally without change in Lorhard's ontology, with the exception that 
Lorhard's text omits all the philosophical commentary (for a comparative taxonomy, 
see [3]).  What is interesting is that in many places where Timpler raises questions 
about his classification and characterization, Lorhard adopts his distinctions without 
indicating that they might be questionable. 
Following Timpler, Lorhard defined ontology as “the knowledge of the intelligible 
by which it is intelligible” [p.1].  His ontology is hence a description of the world of 
intelligibles, i.e., the items, concepts, or objects which are understandable or 
conceivable from a human perspective. The emphasis on the intelligibility of the 
world is essential in Timpler’s and Lorhard’s ontology. When Lorhard followed 
Timpler's lead and adopted this new proposal about the subject matter of metaphysics, 
or ontology, he agreed with the idea that we in formulating ontology are concentrating 
on the knowledge by means of which we can conceive or understand the world. In 
this way ontology is seen as a description of the very foundation of scientific activity 
as such. 
Lorhard holds that the human rationality must function on basis of what he and 
Timpler both call 'the natural light of reason' [p.1]. Ontology captures this 
fundamental understanding of the basic features of the world. Based on this 
knowledge everything else – to the extent that it is intelligible at all – becomes 
conceivable. This approach presupposes that there is in fact only one true ontology – 
the one that reflects to the world as it truly is. The belief was in fact very important 
for the rise of modern science in the early 17th century. According to J. Needham [5], 
the confidence that an order or code of nature can in fact be read and understood by 
human beings was one of the important cornerstones for the rise of modern science in 
Europe. This strong belief was absent in Eastern civilizations in the early 17th century. 
Lorhard, again following Timpler, divides the world of intelligibles into two parts: 
the universals and the particulars. The set of universals can be further divided into two 
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parts: the set of basic objects, and the set of attributes [p.1]. As mentioned in [9] it 
should be noted that Lorhard’s ontology does not begin with a distinction between 
physical and abstract, as many modern ontologies do. As we shall see, however, there 
is a similar distinction integrated in his ontology based on his notion of reality, which 
he uses several times in the ontology.  As a result, a number of important concepts in 
Lorhard’s ontology are mentioned more than once. 
The notion of reality is essential when it comes to ontology. The distinction of 
what is real (realis) as opposed what is not real is used no less than 16 times in 
chapter 8 of Ogdoas Scholastica. However, in his book Lorhard uses the term in a 
rather complex manner, which is apparent from the fact that it contrasted with three 
different concepts in the text: rational (rationalis), imaginary (imaginaria), and verbal 
(verbalis). In the following section, we discuss Lorhard’s use of the term ‘real’ as it is 
introduced in various parts of the text. As we shall see, the term ‘real’ mainly refers to 
‘mind-independent’ or ‘belonging to the external world’. 
3. The Reality of Beings and Attributes 
According to Lorhard, the essence of a being (ens) is that “by which a being is what it 
is” [p.2]. Some beings are real in the sense that they exist independently of human 
cognition, whereas other beings depend on human cognition, i.e., they are beings of 
reason or rationality. The essence of a being of the first kind relates to the external 
world, whereas the essence of a being of the second kind belongs to the internal (or 
mental) world of human cognition. According to Lorhard, there is an important 
duality between the beings themselves and our rational discussion of these being. It 
appears that he insisted on the necessity of this duality, in the sense that each time we 
discuss the beings in the world wanting classify them we also have to reflect on the 
concepts we are using in doing so. Such reflections at the meta-level turn out to form 
an essential part of Lorhard’s work. 
3.1   The Reality of Simple Attributes   
Lorhard identifies two simple and ‘most common’ attributes of intelligibles or beings: 
existence and duration [p.4]. This means that for every intelligible it is correct at least 
to say that it exists in the world, and in some cases we may be able to say more about 
the duration of its existence.  However, with respect to both existence and time, we 
make use of the real/imaginary distinction (realis/imaginaria). An existent intelligible 
might be something real in the sense that it exists independently of all human minds 
(although it is conceivable by the human rationality) or it might be imaginary (i.e., 
something imagined by the human mind). Also the duration of an intelligible might 
depend on a single human mind, in which case it is “imaginary”, or it might be real, 
i.e., independent of the human mind as it is a consequence of the properties of the 
external world. However, even if a duration is real in this sense, it may still have to be 
determined or measured in relation to human decisions regarding temporal units [p.5]. 
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3.2   The Reality of Beings and Complex Attributes 
Real beings, beings which exist "in fact through [their] own essence[s], and further 
[are] suited to exist apart from cogitation of the mind" [p.3], are distributed across 
five different classes, each of which are further divided by a positive and a negative 
characteristic, such as "complex" and "uncomplex", "immaterial" and "material", and 
so on.  This same type of positive/negative division is seen in his classification of 
conjunctive (non-simple) attributes.  He divides conjunctive attributes into eight 
classes of opposing pairs: Every conjunctive attribute is either a principle/a 
principiate; a cause/of cause; a subject/an adjunct; a signifier/signified; a whole/a part; 
the same/diverse; ordered/disordered; prior/posterior [p.17].  In each of these 16 
subclasses, Lorhard makes a distinction between real (i.e., mind-independent) 
attributes and non-real or imaginary attributes which depend on the rationality of the 
human mind. 
We give two specific examples of the reality of complex attributes.  As noted 
above, every conjunctive attribute is either a ‘signifier’ or a ‘signified’ [p.17]. If the 
attribute is in fact a sign, then it is either a natural or an arbitrary sign.  If the former, 
then the reason for the sign relation is something in order of nature [p.28]; if the latter, 
then the reason is a human decision [p.30]. According to Lorhard, an arbitrary sign is 
called real if it is manifest in society, e.g., through some institution. Alternatively, an 
arbitrary sign may just be verbal, i.e., an idea of an individual human being expressed 
in speech or in writing [p.31]. 
Another particularly interesting example of the reality of attributes comes up in his 
discussion of the reality of moral qualities.  It seems to have been essential for him to 
make his students aware of the nature of ethics.  This is evident from the fact that not 
only did he deal in his ontology with the nature of morality, he also has a separate 
book devoted wholly to ethics in his collection of eight schoolbooks. 
In the book on ontology, Lorhard claims that in some cases moral qualities are just 
apparent (he calls these apparent qualities 'imaginary'). In other cases, however, a 
being or an intelligible is in fact “good in reality” [p.15]. Here, however, he does not 
use his standard opposition of imaginaria with realis but instead contrasts apparens 
with verus 'true'. In this way, Lorhard claims that goodness is in fact true in itself, if it 
is a real (i.e. mind-independent) quality.  He treats 'malice' (the contrastive of 
'goodness') in a similar way.  Malice is in some cases true and in other cases it is 
merely apparent. If malice is true, then it is truly bad in itself and without respect to 
anything else. [p.16] 
It is worth noting that according to Lorhard there is in fact something which is 
good in itself and also something which is bad in itself. This means that he accepted 
the idea of an absolute ethics, which is not a construction of human rationality, but 
which on the other hand can be understood or realized by humans. The claim is that 
goodness in the finite world in fact comes from the infinite or eternal good, and the 
goodness not only occurs in the relations between human beings, but that goodness 
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the agreement in a 
being with the rule of 
creation, or of a 
generating Nature. 
[…]
Moral which is an 
agreement of a Being
with moral law: […]
Artificial which is an 
agreement of a Being
with the rule of art. 
[…]
 Excerpt from p. 15 
3.3   The Reality of Structures in the World 
Dealing with the more complex attributes of intelligibles, Lorhard used the notion of 
reality in relation to determinations like ‘identity’ [p.35]. He points out that there are 
two different kinds of identity. In some cases the idea of something being identical 
with something else is just a rational construction, but in other cases a claim of 
identity between two beings is based on external, mind-independent properties of the 
beings in question. In these cases the identity is there objectively speaking, and 
Lorhard refers to it as a 'third thing'. 
Similarly, the order of beings in the world may according to Lorhard be real or 
rational (i.e. just a product of human rationality) [p.39]. If it is real it does not depend 
on human cognition, but is there independently of human observation and cognition. 
A purely rational order, on the other hand, is mind-dependent, i.e., it is there as a 
result of human reason. Lorhard’s ontology contains rather elaborate description of 









posterius. It is 
either
Real, which without 
regard to an 
operation
of the mind exists 
between diverse
beings. It is either
Rational, which
depends on the 
correct
judgment and 
institution of the 
mind. It is either
Primary is either
Secondary is either
Of origin, of them, of which one is 
prior in origin to the other. It is 
called order of nature, or order of 
being.
Of time, of them, of which one is 
prior to the other in time.
Of position, which is of them of which
one through itself maintains superior
position over the over.
Of dignity, which is of them of which
one through itself is more deserving
and more excellent than the other.
Of natural enumeration, which is of 
them of which one through itself is in 
enumeration prior to the other.
Artificial, which are in our cognizing and acting directs. See ♃.
Arbitrary, which something without regard to the prescription of 
art establishes out of consideration of reason and circumstances. 
Indeed it is called order of prudence.
 
Extract from p. 39 
 
Lorhard believed in an essential ‘order of nature’ related to the origin or creation of 
the world. This order is structural. It is, however, important to emphasize that the 
order should not be understood as something static or inescapable. As we shall see, 
the order should be understood in the perspective of time.   
This basic belief in an ordered or structured world was very important for the rise 
of modern science in the same period. It is, however, just as important with respect to 
the scientific project that the order of the world can in fact be studied, investigated, 
and learned by the human mind. This is probably why Lorhard emphasized the 
importance of the duality between on the one hand the real or external order of the 
beings in the world and on the other hand the rational order of beings as it can be 
captured by the human mind. Indeed, he says we obtain a theoretical, rational order of 
beings, i.e., a theoretical order corresponding to order of the external world, through 
our “cognition of things” [p.40]. 
3.4   The Reality of Privation 
One of the most philosophically interesting distinctions that occur in Lorhard's 
ontology is that between being nothing and being negative.  In his very first division 
of intelligibles, he says that an intelligible is either "Nothing: This is simply not 
something" or "Something: Whatever is simply not nothing" [p.1].  The remaining 57 
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pages of Lorhard's book on ontology are devoted to the intelligibles which are 
something; of the intelligibles which are nothing, nothing further is said. This 
distinction between being nothing and being something is copied directly from 
Timpler [bk.1, cap. 2]. Timpler says that an intelligible is anything which is able to be 
perceived and comprehended in the intellect, and that an intelligible is either 
something or nothing.  In contrast to Lorhard, before continuing Timpler raises a 
number of questions whose answering seems to be required and which Lorhard 
doesn't mention at all.  The first is "whether 'nothing' can be an intelligible" [q.1].  
Timpler gives a positive answer to this question, but it is interesting that he feels the 
need to argue for it (and indeed gives a number of different arguments), whereas 
Lorhard simply takes it for granted that 'nothing' is something intelligible. Timpler 
also asks "whether 'something' and 'nothing' are equivalent to 'being' and 'non being'" 
[q.3]. He gives a negative answer to this question ("'being' is not always 
contradictorily opposed to 'non being'" whereas the answer to q.2 is that between 
'something' and 'nothing' no middle ground can be attributed), and as an example he 
says that "privation is called 'non being', and nevertheless is still not nothing". 
It is in the discussion of privation that Lorhard diverges from Timpler's 
metaphysical presentation. Both divide intelligibles which are something into those 
which are positive and those which are negative. Lorhard describes "something 
negative" as a privation "which is a negative habit in a being, of which then it is either 
able or required to be in" [p.58] In contrast, Timpler's discussion of privation is 
separate from his comments on intelligibles which are something negative. He 
classifies privation as an accident, namely, something which can be positively 
attributed to a being.  While privation is a removal of something from a being, it can 
still be affirmed that the removal is present in the being.  When Lorhard says that a 
privation is something negative, he is taking a symmetric view: We do not affirm that 
a privation is present in a being, but instead we deny that some habit or other is 
present in a being. For both Timpler and Lorhard, privations, like other types of 
intelligibles, are divided into those which are mind-independent and those which are 
mind-dependent. It is interesting here that the choice of words that both Lorhard and 
Timpler use is not the usual pair of realis/rationalis or realis/imaginaria but 
verus/ficta ‘true/fictional’ (though Lorhard does add that fictional privation is also 
called rational or imaginary, because it "is attributed solely through a fashioning on 
the mind" [p.58]). The only other time that Lorhard uses 'true' to describe the mind-
independent intelligibles instead of 'real' is when he discusses goodness and malice, 
which we discussed above. There is thus a clear connection between the reality of 
something negative/privation and the reality of the moral qualities, a status which is 
not shared with any of the other intelligibles. 
4. The Temporal Aspects of Beings 
Lorhard’s conceptual framework is basically Aristotelian. Following this tradition 
Lorhard believes that understanding causality is essential for understanding the world. 
This point was formulated by Aristotle himself in the following manner: 
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Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a 
thing till they have grasped the 'why' of (which is to grasp its primary cause). 
[1] 
 
In order to establish a theoretical framework corresponding to the structure of the 
world including its temporal relation he classifies effects based on the four 
Aristotelian causes [p.23]. An effect will always be one of the following: 
 
Caused by reason of efficiency 
Caused by reason of matter 
Caused by reason of form 
Caused by reason of finality 
 
For some reason Lorhard has chosen to list these four causes in a different order from 
the one used by Aristotle himself in Physics Book II, Part 3 [1]. In fact, the four 
causes are listed in the same order later in Lorhard’s ontology when de discusses 
causes of real identity [p.35]. In his book on logic in the Ogdoas, Lorhard has also 
used the Aristotelian order of the four causes. In his logic it is even indicated that the 
four causes should be conceived as two pairs: efficient and material causes on the one 
hand, and formal and final causes on the other hand.  
From a modern perspective the most controversial part of Lorhard’s treatment of 
causality is probably his reference to final causes. A final cause (telos) implies an 
assumption of a purpose. However, according to Lorhard ‘purpose’ does not have to 
refer to human intent. Teleological causes may also be found in nature. There can be 
little doubt that this approach to purpose (telos) in nature should be interpreted in light 
of the religious assumptions incoporated in Lorhard’s ontology. 
The temporal aspects of Lorhard’s ontology can be found not only in his emphasis 
on the importance of causality, they are also evident from the fact that the essence of a 
being introduced in terms of positive characteristics is, according to Lorhard [p.2], an 
actuality or performance (actus). If a being is real, the actuality or performance 
constituting its essence will reflect features in the external world taking place 
independently of human cognition. If the being is not real, the actuality or 
performance in question will depend on human cognition. In both cases the reference 
to ‘actus’ must involve some kind of process. This clearly means that there is an 
aspect of temporality involved in the essence of beings. 
It should be noted that according to Lorhard the world as such can also be seen as a 
result of a number of divine actions, some of which are eternal and some of which are 
temporal. This is due to Lorhard’s religious approach to ontology according which the 
world as a whole from the very beginning has been under divine supervision and 
according to which worldly things have been permanently under divine management. 
The view is that there is “common and usual order of nature” [p.44], which represents 
God’s management (or actions) most of the time. This order of nature will naturally 
be the object for scientific investigation. Sometimes, however, God’s actions are 
extraordinarily different (i.e., miraculous).  
Lorhard divides God’s eternal actions into preordination (i.e., the determination of 
the general plan for the temporal world) and precognition (i.e., the act by which God 
knows anything that is going to happen in the future whether it is necessary or 
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contingent) [p.44]. These actions are carried out from a standpoint outside the 
temporal world. The idea seems to be that there is a non-temporal dimension of 
existence logically prior to time from which God can relate to the temporal world. 
From this non-temporal (or eternal) dimension God can either act in eternity by 
planning the course of events (preordination) or by seeing it (precognition).  
 
 
Excerpt from p. 44 
 
The distinction between eternal and temporal is essential in Lorhard’s ontology. 
This distinction may also be referred to as ‘uncreated/created’ or ‘infinite/finite’. 
Together with ‘real/rational’, the ‘eternal/temporal’-distinction is the most 
fundamental concept in Lorhard’s ontology. In short: it may be held that key concepts 
in Lorhard’s approach to the world of intelligibles are real (as opposed to rational) 
and temporal (as opposed to eternal). 
5. Lorhard’s Ontology as a Hypertext on Reality and Temporality 
of the World 
It turns out that Lorhard’s ontology can be represented as a hypertext on important 
aspects of reality and time which are essential for the understanding of the world. As 
mentioned in the introduction, it is easy to see how Lorhard’s textbook can be 
represented as a modern hypertext because it relies so heavily on cross references. A 



























Preordination, which is an external action, by which he from eternity 
has determined, for his liberty and good will, what, in his time, might 
be future, and indeed he has ordained a fixed means because of it. 
 
Precognition, is an external act of God, by which he foreknows from 
eternity all future things before they exist. 
Creation, which is an 
external act of God, by 
which in the beginning of 
time he had produced the 
world and all species of 
things sustained in him by 
a hyperphysical mode, & 
to this point in his time he 
does not produce an 
indivisible out of no 
things. 
 
Management of things, is 
an external action of God 
by which the world is 
made in itself, [and by 
which] he administers and 
conserves wisely and 
competently all things 
which are in it. It is either 
Ordinary, by which God according to usual 
and common arrangement and course of 
nature by his own sanctification, 
administers and conserves worldly things. 
 
Extraordinary, is that by which God 
contrary to the common and usual order of 
nature and by his own sanctification 
administers and conserves certain things in 
the world. 
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ontology that will be dealt with later. By choosing a graphical style of representation, 
Lorhard was able to not just present the concepts of his system, but also the structure 
that connects the concepts. This gives the obvious advantage that a single glance at a 
page reveals for instance how many subdivisions a given concept has. But the 
graphical representation also comes at a cost, namely that some of the strands of 
relations introduced in the early parts must ‘wait’ for many pages before being 
charted out. In this respect, it is remarkable that Lorhard throughout the ontology 
maintains such a close correspondence with Timpler’s work, as shown by Lamanna 
[3]. It would not have been surprising if the diagrammatical style resulted in a 
different ordering of the material, but this is not the case. This observation adds to the 
important question of how the diagrams should in fact be read. An analysis of this 
question may pave the road for designing systems equipped to deal with such 
complex representations. 
5.1   The Didactic Nature of the Representation  
As mentioned above, the Ogdoas is intended to function as a textbook, and it seems 
reasonable to assume that it was used as lecture notes by Lorhard and his students. As 
such, it would be incorrect to view the text exclusively as a hierarchy of concepts or 
types. Rather, the diagrams take on form as didactic aids suited to address the 
questions at hand. In support of this view is should be noted that not only the 
ontology, but all the eight books are written in this style.  
It is still an open question how much of the actual layout of the ontology was due to 
printer's constraints, and how much influence Lorhard had on the questions of layout. 
For example, the entire section on "Goodness" has been forced onto one page, 
whereas "Malice", which is structurally simpler, is divided up into multiple lettered 
sections over more than one page.  In the absence of the original manuscript, we 
cannot say for certain whether such formatting differences have any underlying 
signification.  
5.2   The Nature of Repetitions  
An important feature in Lorhard’s work is, as we have demonstrated, the use of 
repetitions. In [9] we mention the extensive use meta comments (or notes) within the 
ontology, which from a modern point of view cannot be seen as part of the actual 
hierarchy. Even more pertinent is the repeated divisions into dichotomies such as: 
created / uncreated (which occur 10 times), generic / specific (9 times), complex / 
uncomplex (6 times); and as pointed out above, the crucial distinctions of the real, 
which occurs no less than 15 times, contrasted with rational (7 times), imaginary (6 
times), verbal (once), and ‘of reason’ (once). Quite obviously these terms function not 
as types in a hierarchy, but closer to the modern notion of metaproperties often 
discussed in contemporary research, see for example [2]. The use of repeated 
distinctions adds to the number of steps one has to go through in order to grasp a 
given concept. In our opinion, the repetitions also add to the difficulty of mentally 
navigating the ontology. But this solution does address another fundamental problem 
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in ontology engineering, namely the critical problem of the top distinctions. It turns 
out that the entire structure is affected by these repetitions, and it seems therefore at 
least reasonable to suggest that the top distinctions de facto chosen by Lorhard (the 
subject / predicate structure distributed over the universal and the particular) should 
be seen as balanced by other important top distinctions. Thus, if the entire structure is 
rearranged according to whether elements are dependent on human cognition or not, 
the entire ontology could be ‘turned upside down’, whereby the subject / predicate 
distinction would be needed as metaproperties. Large portions of the ontology could 
be treated in the same way if Lorhard’s use of created / uncreated was employed as a 
top distinction, etc.   
5.3   Hypertext Arrangements 
A contemporary version of Lorhard’s text could be a simple hypertext as suggested in 
[7]. This implementation remains true to the original and preserves the structure in a 
very direct manner. Possible non-invasive additions could include more navigational 
aids such as a bi-directional link structure to help maintain the awareness of the big 
picture. It would also be desirable to have the actual book pages shown alongside the 
translation. See the sample page here below. 
More advanced solutions could take on the challenge of dynamically rearranging 
the ontology according to the metaproperties discussed above. Such a system should 
be able to lift specific distinctions from the structure and rearrange the hierarchy 
based on all these occurrences. The central idea is to designate a given division as the 
privileged distinction by means of which the remaining ontology is organized. 
Important criteria for selecting the privileged distinction is how often it is used, and to 
what effect, e.g., how big a portion of the original structure is affected by the 
distinction. Any such selection (except the actual top distinction) would carve up the 
ontology in two parts: One part consisting of concepts directly affected by the 
selection, and one part consisting of concepts outside the scope of the current 
selection. The former of these would consist of fragments to be rearranged and if 
possible, also merged. The second part should also be listed thereby making the scope 
of the selection visible. The result would be a dynamic arrangement of original 




We have seen that Lorhard, following Timpler, defined ontology as the fundamental 
study of the intelligible world. In this way ontology is presented as the very 
foundation of scientific activity– including the important relations between scientific 
and religious concepts. We have also pointed out that Lorhard does not use the 
distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ which has become very common in 
modern ontology as an upper-level distinction. Instead, Lorhard makes an important 
distinction between what is mind-dependent (what Lorhard calls ‘rational’) and with 
is not mind-dependent (what Lorhard calls ‘real’). In addition he distinguishes 
between time, where natural intelligibles exist, and eternity, by which the relations 
between the scientific and religious matters are understood. In short: The key 
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distinctions in Lorhard’s ontology and his approach to the world of intelligibles are 
rational/real and temporal/eternal. 
Lorhard’s ontology is a schoolbook using a diagrammatical approach in the 
tradition after Peter of Ramus. Lorhard accepted the view that ontology was essential 
as the foundation of science and knowledge in general. In this way ontology in not 
only about being, but it is about the broader world of intelligibility. Lorhard’s work 
may be seen as a typical representation of the philosophical ideas behind the rise of 
modern science. And in addition, Lorhard’s ontology serves as an example of 




Page 8 containing one of the realis iterations.  
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